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Participatory sensing is an innovative model in mobile sensing networks, which allows volunteers to collect and share information
from their local environment by using mobile phones. Unlike other participatory sensing application challenges that consider user
privacy and data trustworthiness, this study focuses on the network trustworthiness problem, namely, Sybil attacks, in participatory
sensing. A Sybil attack is defined as amalicious illegal presentation ofmultiple identities, called Sybil identities.These Sybil identities
will intend to spread false information to reduce the effectiveness of sensing data in the participatory sensing network. To cope with
this problem, a cloud based trust management scheme (CbTMS) was proposed to detect Sybil attacks in the participatory sensing
network.The CbTMSwas proffered for performing Sybil attack characteristic checks, in addition to a trustworthiness management
system, to verify the covered nodes in the participatory sensing network. Simulation studies show that the proposed CbTMS can
efficiently detect numerous defined malicious Sybil nodes in the network with relatively low power consumption.
1. Introduction
In recent years, mobile computing devices on the market, for
example, smartphones and tablet computers, have become
ubiquitous. Differing from the last century, the mobile
phone of today, namely, the smartphone, usually comes with
multifunction sensors, such as camera, microphone, GPS,
accelerometer, digital compass, and gyroscope. These new
technologies have enabled smartphone users to collect sensed
data from their neighboring environment and upload these
sensed data back to an application server using existing
wireless communication infrastructure (such as 3G and 4G
services or WiMAX access points). Smartphones provide
an excellent platform for participatory sensing [1]. Hence, a
requester of data can create tasks that use the general public
to capture geotagged images, videos, audio snippets, or all-
out surveys. Participants who have installed the client apps
on their smartphones can submit their data and get rewarded.
For example, panoramic 3D photosynthesis of businesses
and restaurant photos from Gigwalk has been collected by
Microsoft Bing Map.
A plethora of novel and fascinating participatory sensing
applications have appeared in recent years, ranging from
health care to multiple cultural aspects. Two examples of
participatory sensing applications are BALANCE [2] and
HealthSense [3], used to collect and share data about personal
health projects which monitor the activities and behavior
related to diet and encourage healthy living. Participatory
sensing application provides a very open concept platform
which allows anybody to contribute their sensing data; how-
ever, it may also leak malicious and erroneous attacks to the
application. Sharing sensed data tagged with spatiotemporal
information could reveal a lot of personal information, such
as users’ identity, personal activities, political views, and
health status, thereby posing threats to the participating
users. Malicious participants may unintentionally position
the phone in an adverse position or deliberately contribute
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bad data while collecting sensor readings from mobile
phones.
Many researchers have investigated privacy techniques
for anonymous data collection in location-based services
(LBS), particularly in participatory sensing systems. Most of
the current researches in participatory sensing have focused
on user privacy and anonymity [4, 5], with little work on
network integrity and protection. However, mobile phones in
telecommunication networks rely on assumptions of identity,
where each mobile or smartphone’s IMEI (international
mobile equipment identity) numbers represent one’s identity.
Hence, an attacker with many identities can use them to
act maliciously, by either stealing information or providing
incorrect data via a Sybil attack in participatory sensing envi-
ronments. The Sybil attack was first introduced by Microsoft
researcher Douceur [6]. A Sybil attack relies on the fact that
a participatory sensing network data server cannot ensure
that each unknown data collecting element is a distinct,
mobile phone.Therefore, anymalicious participatory sensing
network attack can try to inject false information into the
network to confuse or even collapse the network applications.
Cloud computing has attractedmuch research and indus-
trial attention as a new computing paradigm for providing
flexible and on-demand infrastructures. Everything is treated
as a service in the cloud, for example, SaaS (software as a
service), PaaS (platform as a service), and IaaS (infrastructure
as a service), and delineated as a layered system structure for
cloud computing. Trust management is one of the most chal-
lenging problems in cloud computing development; recently,
many approaches have been proposed for trust management
in cloud environments. Nevertheless, not much attention has
been paid to determining the credibility of trust feedbacks.
To solve this problem, a Cloud based Trust Management
Scheme (CbTMS) is proposed to evaluate the trustworthiness
of volunteer networks in participatory sensing applications.
This CbTMS framework provides a credit calculator, asso-
ciated with mobile devices, that reflects the level of trust
perceived over a period of time. Hence, a high credit score
is an indication that a particular smartphone device has been
reporting reliable communication in the past. To verify this
idea, the OMNeT++ simulation has been used to present our
CbTMS’s effectiveness against Sybil attacks. The rest of this
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review of related works and summarizes their conclusions.
Section 3 provides the detection factors motivating the need
for a reputation system in the context of participatory
sensing; it presents an overview of the system architecture. In
Section 4, the experimental setup and simulation results are
described. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background
In recent years, there have been more andmore participatory
sensing applications in different fields. For example, in
personal health monitoring, BALANCE [2] allows clients
to monitor their activities and diet behavior, encouraging
healthy living. Food calories are entered via mobile phones
and an accelerator detects movement patterns and time
to project the calories consumed, thereby achieving health
management. HealthSense [3] automatically detects health-
related events, such as pain or depression which cannot
be observed directly through current sensor technology.
HealthSense analyzes sensor data from the patient by apply-
ing machine learning methods. HealthSense also utilizes
patient input events to assist in data classification (such
as pain or itching). Finally, the user provides feedback on
the machine learning process. As mentioned, participatory
sensing applications are subject to malicious attacks.
Douceur formalized the Sybil attack in the context of
peer-to-peer networks [6]. He showed that there is no prac-
tical solution for this attack and indicated that Sybil attacks
can defeat the redundancy mechanisms of distributed data
storage systems. Problems arise when a reputation system
(such as a trusted certification) is tricked into thinking that an
attacking computer has a disproportionally large influence.
Grover et al. [7] proposed a scheme to protect against the
Sybil attack using neighboring nodes’ information. In this
approach, every node will participate to detect the suspicious
node in the network. Everymobile node has a different group
of neighbors at different time interval. After sharing their
tables, they match their neighboring tables; if some nodes
are simultaneously observed with the same set of neighbors
at different interval of time, then these nodes are under
Sybil attack. In this case, identities are neighboring nodes
associated with specific trust devices. Similar to a central
authority creating certificates, there are few ways to prevent
an attacker from attaining multiple devices.
Trust and reputation have been verified as influencing
customers or users in selecting high quality service in mul-
tiple situations.The concept of trust and reputation is similar
in computational models that can be formally characterized
based on history of past interactions. For instance, after the
completion of the transaction of rating among parties, the
aggregated ratings about a given party can then be used
to derive its reputation score. Nonetheless, it seems that
threats to users’ privacy will be encountered. To solve this
problem, Ries [8] instinctively allows the analysis of trust as
a subjective probability, which allows for the consideration
of personal preferences and context-dependent parameters.
However, building up trust and reputation usually requires
long-term categorizing that can be a link across numerous
transactions.
In cloud computing, trust management is one of themost
critical issues and is popular in research area [9, 10]. For
example, Brandic et al. [9] proposed a compliance manage-
ment in cloud environments using a centralized approach
that support the cloud service consumers in selecting proper
cloud services from their own perspective. Hwang and Li
[10] proposed a security aware cloud architecture from a
provider perspective where data coloring techniques and
trust negotiation are used to support the cloud service. The
cloud service consumers perspective is supported using the
trust-overlay networks to deploy a reputation-based trust
management. However, unlike previous works that apply
a centralized architecture, a credibility model supporting
distributed trust feedback assessment and storage has been
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Figure 1: Architecture of the trust as a service framework.
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presented. This credibility model also distinguishes between
trustworthy and malicious trust feedback.
Due to the participatory sensing applications, partic-
ipants allow anyone with an appropriate device that has
Attack edgesGenuine nodes
Sybil nodes
Figure 4: A conceptual network topology of Sybil attack activities.
the application installed to register as a participant. Such
human intervention entails serious security and privacy risks.
The free transmission of users’ sensor data could result in
compromised privacy. For instance, users may leak their
personal identity information through personal responses.
The possibility of users receiving incorrect data from the
network can lead to integrity problems if the source is
malicious participants. For example, a malicious user can
tamper with and report data to other participants [4].
However, participatory sensing introduces different security
issues because devices are already in the hands of potential
adversaries. A misbehaving participant may produce false
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Table 1: Simulation implementation parameter lists.
Parameter Value
Simulation area 1600m ∗ 600m
Simulation time 3000 s
Number of nodes 100
Node mobility Random way point
Pay load size 512 B
Positive threshold 40
Negative threshold −40
Initial trust value of a node 0
Carrier frequency 2.4GHz
Mobility speed 10mps
Transmitter power 2.0Mw
SNIR threshold 4 dB
Bitrate 54Mbps
Thermal noise −110 dBm
Sensitivity −90 dBm
Send buffer timeout 300 s
sensing data or send false data randomly to deceive the server
[5].
As described above, mechanisms and algorithms for
participatory sensing application, Sybil attack and cloud
computing trust models have been proposed and discussed.
However, their approaches are not applicable to detect Sybil
attacks in participatory sensing environments by utilizing
trust management system. Therefore, we attempt to identify
Sybil attacks in participatory sensing environment by utiliz-
ing a cloud based trust management system that distinguish
between credible trust nodes’ feedbacks and malicious trust
nodes’ feedbacks through a credibility model.
3. Detection of the Sybil Attack in
Participatory Sensing Factors
The participating entities in the system include smartphone
or tablet PC, and the service provider will support inter-
actions between them, that is, inquiries about environment
information service. Therefore, such interaction will specify
the service content. For example, a user using his smart-
phone, namely, entity A, is interacting with service providers
regarding temperature information in his current location.
Then, entity A here, an interaction initiator, will select a
service provider from a set of available service providers;
he/she will evaluate the trustworthiness of the available
service providers from the selection list. Hereby, entity A will
analyze the direct evidence from previous interactions and
recommendations (also called indirect evidence) from one or
multiple service providers. The trust model can be used for
aggregating the evidence removing or giving lower weight to
recommendations from unreliable sources and deriving trust
values for the service providers, which then can become the
basis for decidingwhether to interact with one of the available
service providers and which service provider to select.
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Figure 5: Hybrid reputation monitoring diagram.
Therefore, a cloud based service management framework
has been proposed in this paper that consists of a trust as a
service (TaaS) using the service oriented architecture (SOA).
In particular, the proposed cloud based service management
framework applies web services to interact with distributed
smartphones. This web service is one of the most important
enabling technologies for cloud computing; hence, its simi-
larities to other resources (e.g., software, infrastructures, and
platforms) in the cloud are exposed as services. Therefore,
when there is a trusted participant wishing to give his/her
trust feedback or inquire about the current trust data in
our SOA, he/she can utilize feedback message such as text
messaging or multimedia messaging to deliver his/her own
data or to get inquired trust data. Figure 1 depicts the
framework; it consists of three different layers: the cloud
service provider layer, the trust management system layer,
and the cloud service consumer layer.
The cloud service provider layer consists of different
cloud service providers which provide cloud services. The
minimum indicative feature that every cloud service provider
should have is providing the infrastructure as a service;
that is, the cloud provider should have a data center that
provides the storage, the process, and the communication.
The trust management system layer: this layer consists of
several distributed trust management system (TMS) nodes
that expose interfaces so that cloud service consumers can
give their trust feedbacks or inquire about the trust results.
The cloud service consumer layer: finally, this layer consists
of different cloud service consumers. For example, a new
startup that has limited funding can consume cloud services
(e.g., hosting their services in Amazon S3). A cloud service
consumer can give trust feedbacks of a particular cloud
service by invoking the TMS.
However, participatory sensing in the wireless envi-
ronment is exposed to malicious participants deliberately
contributing forged nodes and bad data.Thesemalicious par-
ticipants can also exploit these links to remove the anonymity
of the volunteers and compromise their privacy. Like other
networks, the security requirements in participatory sens-
ing include services such as authentication, confidentiality,
integrity, and access control to defend against malicious
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Figure 6: Simulation graphical view of nodes.
Figure 7: Running in normal mode.
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participants.Threats such as Sybil attack should be addressed.
Therefore, identifying specific Sybil identity features in the
participatory sensing network needs to be addressed. For
example, when Sybil identities compromise a participatory
sensing network, a Sybil identity will impersonate multiple
identities. Hence, these Sybil identities will move in a united
way because all these impersonating nodes were propagated
by a single physical device. As Sybil identitiesmove geograph-
ically, all of them will appear or disappear simultaneously as
the attacker moves in and out of range. This phenomenon
differs from a healthy participatory sensing network where
participators are free to move at will.
Therefore, this CbTMS framework exploits Sybil attack
characteristics to perform Sybil attack detection based on
the following three assumptions. First, it is assumed that the
participatory sensing network traffic can record in the cloud.
Therefore, the normal network traffic and abnormal network
traffic can be observed and analyzed. Second, it is assumed
that each user and service provider who wants to participate
in the system possesses a unique, initial identifier, which
is obtained at the bootstrapping phase from a party that is
trusted by all involved parties (i.e., users, services directory
provider, and service providers).Third, it is assumed that each
Sybil identity uses a single-channel radio;multiple Sybil iden-
tities must transmit serially whereas multiple independent
nodes can transmit in parallel.
3.1. Characteristics Checking Scheme. This CbTMS frame-
work includes a passive characteristics checking scheme
(CCS) that simultaneously keeps Sybil nodes in check, includ-
ing traffic volume, signal strength, and network topology.
This CCS introduces an adaptive threshold (similar to the
watchdog implementation method) to identify the charac-
teristics of Sybil attacks in participatory sensing network.
This CCS is implemented in the cloud side. It regularly
checks the covered participatory sensing node’s conditions
to decide whether the node’s identity is genuine or has
been compromised. The CCS will set multiple adaptive
thresholds to monitor covered participatory sensing nodes’
characteristics and is implemented as part of the system
operations process running on the cloud server. When a
requester inquires about the trust credit of an inspector from
the CbTMS framework, if the passive CCS does not detect
any attack pattern on the node, it returns no attack pattern
found to the requester. Otherwise, it will notify the requester
to disconnect suspicious malicious node(s).
3.1.1. Traffic Volume. Inside a base-station communication
range, there may be several thousand mobile devices, with
multiple applications for each device. Hence, the next step
is to further identify different groups within the mobile
device populationwith different characteristics and refine the
models. Due to different devices exhibiting vastly different
behaviors and traffic patterns, a naive extension of this model
will be to develop a specialized model for every device
type. The next step is to further identify groups in device
population with similar characteristics and refine themodels.
As mentioned in our background work, once a Sybil identity
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has compromised a partial participatory sensing, it will create
a number of online identities and use these identities to
compromise participant sensing.Therefore, by analyzing this
traffic volume, signal strength, and network topology at a
regular period, our CbTMS framework can infer whether the
system has suspicious Sybil identities.
In our framework, the dynamic traffic of the participa-
tory sensing network is recorded in the cloud. It can be
represented as 𝐹 = ⟨𝐹1, 𝐹2, . . . , 𝐹𝑖, . . .⟩, where 𝐹𝑖 denotes the
traffic at time 𝑖. The proposed CbTMS framework may group𝑛 entries in 𝐹 into a single entry. For example, assuming𝑛 = 2, the new sequence for the traffic volume becomes⟨𝐹1𝐹2,𝐹3𝐹4, 𝐹5𝐹6, 𝐹7𝐹8, 𝐹9𝐹10, . . .⟩. Thus, the traffic volume
can bemeasured and analyzedwith different time resolutions.
Our goal is to obtain normal and abnormal trafficmodels
from the collected sensing data. For this purpose, the 𝑘-
means clustering [6], which is a well-known method for par-
tition clustering, is applied in our framework. The 𝑘-means
clustering can associate every observation with the nearest
mean, and hence is useful for cluster analysis, especially for
a large number of variables and data sets. More specifically
speaking, in this study, the 𝑘-means clustering can be used to
divide the sensing data space so as to distinguish the normal
and the abnormal trafficmodels.The intra-cluster heterology𝑉 has been used formeasure to select the appropriate value of𝑘. As presented in formula (1), the value of heterology 𝑉 will
be calculated for increasing values of 𝑘 starting from 𝑘 = 2.
Intra-cluster heterology is defined as
𝑉 = 𝑘∑
𝑖=1
∑
𝑥𝑗∈𝑆𝐼
(𝑥𝑗 − 𝜇𝐼)2 (1)
where 𝑥𝑗 is a data point residing in 𝑖th cluster, 𝑢𝑖 is the
centroid point of 𝑖th cluster, 𝑆𝑖 is the collection of all the data
point residing in cluster 𝑖, and 𝑘 is the number of clusters.
For instance, we can group the normal network traffic volume
to 𝑆𝑐 and 𝑆𝑟. Now, 𝑘-means clustering has been applied to
analyze and divide normal and abnormal network traffic into
distinct groups. In this study, we can calculate the value of 𝑉
for increasing values of 𝑘. As shown an example in Figure 2,
T8’s 𝑆𝑐 and 𝑆𝑟 ratio are obviously different from the other
groups. In this situation, the CCS can analyze the network
traffic volume in the cloud DB and assume that suspected
Sybil identities existed in the participatory sensing network.
3.1.2. Signal Strength . After the suspected Sybil identities
are detected using the traffic volume as described above,
the signal strength of these suspected Sybil identities are
further analyzed. The signal strength is determined by con-
sidering the number of neighbor nodes inside a base station
communication range. For example, when Sybil identities
have compromised a participatory sensing network, it will
representmultiple fake identities and exchange of data among
them. Fortunately, this gives our CCS an opportunity to
obtain and check the signal strength of Sybil identities.
However, we do not check the entire transmission signal.
We only check the transmission signal from Sybil identity
has successfully received by its neighbor node. For example,
we denoted the number𝑆, 0 ≤ 𝑆 ≤ 1, is a signal-received
probability that a transmission signal will be picked up by
a neighbor node of a Sybil identity. Then, we denoted the
number𝑠, 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 1,isthe probability of whether this
neighbor node will receive the signal. For each transmission,
the transmission signal will be checked only if 𝑠 < 𝑆.
Assume that 𝑅 represents the maximum ratio difference,𝑃𝑟 represents received signal strength, and 𝑃𝑒 represents
expected received signal strength. Given a signal, the ratio
difference 𝑟 is shown in formula 2.
𝑟 = 1 − (min (𝑃𝑟, 𝑃𝑒)
max (𝑃𝑟, 𝑃𝑒)) . (2)
For any signal that is received by a node, a suspicious
signal can be classified if its ratio different 𝑟 > 𝑅. In addition,
this signal strength may have precision problem because
of received signal measurement result will depend on the
transmitter geographical location. An example is shown in
Figure 3. Figure 3(a) shows that, in an original network, there
are 4 mobile nodes in the base-station communication range,
and Figure 3(b) shows that there are other 6 suspicious Sybil
nodes when Sybil attacks occur.
3.1.3. Network Topology. Because each Sybil group will
present a similar topography map, nodes will be very fre-
quently heard together evenwhen they are not Sybil identities
and will rarely be heard apart as they do not move out
of radio range. This leads to a false identification rate in
topographies that are denser in terms of nodes per square
meter. Hence, the accuracy and error rates for a single node
observer when a Sybil attacker is present will be very obvious.
Again, in smaller topographies, there is insufficient mixing to
separate Sybil identities from real nodes, and the error rate
is high, as is the detection rate, because all nodes are seen as
part of the same identity. As the topography size increases,
the number of meaningful observations that a single node
can make increases; and the true positive rate stays high,
on the order of 95%, while, during the false positive, rate
drops significantly. As the topography size increases further,
the number of observations that a single node can make is
reduced, as all nodes are spread far apart, and the accuracy of
identifying the Sybil identities decreases.
As shown in Figure 4, when Sybil attacks occur, the
network topology can be conceptually divided into two parts:
one consisting of all genuine identities and the other consist-
ing of all Sybil identities.The link connecting a genuine node
to a Sybil node is called an attack edge [12].
3.1.4. Trust Credit Assessment. In our framework, the trust
credit of a participatory sensing node is evaluated by our
trust credit assessment (TCA) scheme. It is represented by
a collection of invocation history records denoted by 𝐻.
Each requester node 𝑟 holds a point of view regarding the
trustworthiness of an inspector node 𝑖 in the invocation
history record which is managed by a trust management
service. Each invocation history record is represented in a
tuple that consists of the participatory sensing node primary
identity 𝑃, the inspector node identity 𝐼, a set of trust
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credits 𝑇, and the aggregated trust feedbacks weighted by
the credibility 𝑇𝑐 (i.e., 𝐻 = (𝑃, 𝐼, 𝑇, 𝑇𝑐). Each credit in 𝑇 is
represented in numerical form with the range of [0, 1], where
0, +1, and 0.5 signify negative feedback, positive feedback,
and neutral, respectively.
Whenever a requester node inquires the trust manage-
ment service regarding the trustworthiness of an inspector
node 𝑖, the trust result, denoted by Tr(𝑖), is calculated as
Tr (𝑖) = |V (𝑖)| 𝑇𝑐 (𝑙, 𝑖)|V (𝑖)| , (3)
where 𝑉(𝑖) is all of the feedbacks given to the inspector node𝑖 and |𝑉(𝑖) represents the length of the 𝑉(𝑖) (i.e., the total
number of feedbacks given to the inspector node 𝑖).𝐹𝑐(𝑙, 𝑖) are
the trust feedbacks from the 𝑙th cloud consumer weighted by
the credibility.
3.1.5. Analytical Decision Making. Based on both CCS and
TCA examination results, each suspicious Sybil node will
require an analytical decision-making approach to determine
the probability. This problem is typically well suited to the
application of structured decision processes. In a similar
manner, analytical decisions are best approached by way of
analytical decision strategy.The observation credit result will
be based on the investigation from the conditions described
by CCSmodules; therefore, the results cannot be generalized.
Each decision described was assigned a score with the range
of [0, 1], where 0, +1, and 0.5 mean negative, positive, and
neutral, respectively. The credit result is presented as the
percentage of threshold that is similar to the pattern of Sybil
attacks defined by the author.The detection rate corresponds
to the probability of positive detection (𝑃𝑑 ratio) of Sybil iden-
tities from all suspicious nodes. Under normal conditions, it
corresponds to the probability of declaring a false positive 𝐹𝑝,
which indicates that we wrongly considered suspicious nodes
as Sybil identities. The detection rate and false positive rate
vary under different thresholds. In summarizing the results,
if bothCCS andTCAmodules approachedmaking a decision
in a manner consistent with the defined threshold and score,
the result is trustworthy.
3.1.6. An Example of the Scenario. As this attack has no rela-
tion to the identification scheme, we do not further evaluate
it. On the other hand, an attacker can utilize Sybil attacks to
compromise and control a genuine node. The compromised
genuine node will be considered as a Sybil node and not
as a genuine node. This Sybil node will focus on creating
multiple online user identities called Sybil identities and try to
achieve malicious results through these identities. As shown
in Figure 5, we will implement our CbTMS algorithm in
three phases. In the first phase, the cloud server-sidemanager
will record network traffic to those who participate in the
system and define multiple adaptive thresholds, including
traffic volume, signal strength, and network topology, to
evaluate network trustworthiness. When a Sybil identity uses
a single-channel radio and has been identified as exceeding
the adaptive threshold range in our CCS, the CCS module
will generate a notification to the TCA. Then, the TCA will
draw these inspector node history records from its database
and process the credit assessment. Once the Sybil attack
pattern has been preliminarily identified, it will enable the
analytical decision making (ADM) to further analyze and
determine the Sybil attacks in this network. This framework
will check regular network and system statistics and use
an adaptive threshold to achieve network trustworthiness.
To improve the completeness of the analysis by observing
how a Sybil identity behaves in participatory environments,
it will require cooperation with telecommunication service
cloud providers. In this cloud, we can develop a subset of
systemcalls invoked by the analyzed program in amobile user
environment and receive the result of the computation.
4. Experimental Evaluations
In this section, the proposed algorithm cloud based trust
management scheme (CbTMS) has been simulated in
OMNeT++ [13]. OMNeT++ is an extensible, modular,
component-based, C++ simulation library and framework
which also includes an integrated development and a graph-
ical runtime. It provides a generic component architecture
based on object oriented approach. Model components are
termed modules which primarily communicate with each
other via message passing either directly or via predefined
conditions and the message can arrive from another module
or from the samemodule.TheCbTMShas been implemented
in OMNeT++ based on the inetmanet framework as an
add-on to the dynamic source routing (DSR) algorithm and
utilizes the randomway pointmodel formobility of the nodes
because this model can well depict a real world situation.This
mobility model is based on an entity mobility model where
the nodes move independently of each other. The simulation
work has taken the following parameters for implementation
as shown in Table 1 and Figure 6.
4.1. Malicious Sybil Node and Compromised Node Selection.
Based on previous sections, the described malicious Sybil
identities will be exposed to like malicious participants that
can deliberately contribute forge nodes and bad data. In
our simulation experience, Sybil identities were designed to
modify packet contents and participated in route discovery
and route maintenance. They will not forward packets to
neighbor nodes, but only to specific compromised nodes.
Hence, the packet routing paths will be the same even
when new formal nodes join the routing process. Moreover,
when the Sybil identity has compromised its neighbor nodes,
they will have the same mobility model. Furthermore, in a
Sybil attack, the selection of compromised nodes based on
detecting node misbehavior was done in a random manner.
These compromised nodes will have a random number
generator inside them so that every time they need to see its
value before overhearing the channel. If the random number
was evaluated as 0, then they will turn on their compromised
mode to forward the malicious message to their neighbor
nodes or else they had to remain idle. This idle state will also
result in a lot of power saving of the compromised nodes
without affecting the fault detection.
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4.2. Dynamic Source Routing. The dynamic source routing
protocol (DSR) is a common stack and efficient routing
protocol based on the inetmanet framework in OMNeT++
designed specifically for use in multihop wireless ad hoc
networks of mobile nodes. To configure multiple Sybil nodes
with multiple routes to the same Sybil identity, Sybil identity
is allowed to respond to the same route solicitation if it is
received through different paths. The protocol is composed
of the two primary mechanisms of route discovery and
route maintenance, which act in concert to permit nodes
to discover and maintain routes to arbitrary destinations in
the ad hoc network. Therefore, if a route request (RREQ)
is received after a previous RREQ from the same origin
has been responded, a node can decide to send a new
route reply (RREP) message to the origin to build up a
different path. Other advantages of the DSR protocol include
easily guaranteed loop-free routing, operation in networks
containing unidirectional links, use of only “soft state” in
routing, and very rapid recovery when routes in the network
change. The DSR protocol is designed mainly for mobile
ad hoc networks of up to about two hundred nodes and is
designed to work well with even very high rates of mobility.
4.3. Results. Ideally, the average power consumption for a
participatory sensing node mode is 73Wh as defined normal
mode as indicated in Figure 7. The Wh is a unit of energy
equivalent to one watt of power expended for one hour of
time. On the other hand, in a malicious Sybil node attack
mode, the average power consumption is much higher than
in a normal mode. Our simulation result shows that each
node will consume 100Wh on an average. On the case
of DSR routing protocol, it based on the nodes have to
cooperate to find a path between nodes. It allows nodes
to discover and maintain routes to arbitrary destinations in
the ad hoc network. Therefore, it will consume enormous
power in the network in our malicious Sybil node mode.
But compared with the proposed CbTMS algorithm, we
will detect malicious Sybil node and compromised nodes to
prevent communication overhead. In our simulation setup,
there are 26 nodes in maximum are have been setup as Sybil
identity mode. The proposed CbTMS provides lower power
consumption compared with the DSR routing protocol as
shown in Figure 8.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a Cloud based Trust Management Scheme
(CbTMS) was proposed for detecting Sybil attacks in partici-
patory sensing networks. Sybil attacks create multiple online
user identities called Sybil identities, and try to compro-
mise systems with its malicious information through these
identities. The proposed CbTMS framework can perform
trust management and reputation checker to verify the
nodes in the participatory sensing network. It combines two
schemes, namely, Characteristics Checking Scheme (CCS)
and Trust Credit Assessment (TCA), to detect suspicious
Sybil nodes. CCS was proposed for passively monitoring the
characteristics of the suspicious Sybil nodes, including time,
density, and topology in the participatory sensing; whereas,
TCA was proposed for evaluating the trustworthiness of the
suspicious Sybil nodes. Our simulation studies shows that our
CbTMS can efficiently detect the malicious Sybil nodes in the
network with relatively low power consumption.
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